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"A madman is punished by his madness alone"'
INTRODUCTION
Since the moratorium on the death penalty was lifted in 1976,2
approximately 243 executions have been carried out in the United
States.3 Presently, more than 2,800 individuals wait on the nation's
death rows to be executed.4 While the Eighth Amendment's pro-
1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (1769).
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See Appendix 1 for a list ofjurisdictions that have the death penalty.
3. Telephone Interview with Richard Dieter, Executive Officer of the Death
Penalty Information Center, Washington, D.C. (June 13, 1994) [hereinafter Dieter].
4. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row U.S.A. (May 1994).
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scription against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment does
not bar the death penalty as a mode of punishment, it does regulate
who is eligible to be executed. A prime example of this dimension
of the Eighth Amendment is reflected in Ford v. Wainwright.6 In
Ford, the Court held that the interaction between the death eligibility
and cruel and unusual punishment facets of the Eighth Amendment
prohibit executing mentally incompetent condemned inmates.7
However, unfortunately, the Court failed to describe the precise
manner by which states must devise their competency-to-execute
plans in order to ensure that the substantive right created by Ford is
granted. As a result, it is doubtful that all condemned inmates enti-
tled to Ford's protection receive that protection. This consequence of
the present manifestation of the Ford right is dependent upon the
fact that the question of what the Constitution requires respecting the
key components of this exempt status has yet to be resolved. The
critical components of a competency-to-execute plan include deter-
mining: the appropriate term to identify and refer to the exempted
individuals, the appropriate definition of this term, which standard
should be adopted to assess whether a condemned inmate, who ini-
tially qualifies for protection under Ford, ultimately receives the
rule's benefit, and the appropriate course of action to take after a
condemned inmate has been granted the substantive right created by
Ford. Unfortunately, the continued failure to comprehensively and
uniformly resolve the broader issue-what is required for a compe-
tency-to-execute plan to be constitutional-and its derivative issues
enhance the risk that this constitutional right will be violated.
It is not only this risk that makes it imperative to examine and
to assess the acceptability of competency-to-execute plans. This eval-
uation of the constitutionality of competency-to-execute plans is of
ever increasing importance' because of the burgeoning number of
individuals receiving death sentences and the increasing number of
condemned inmates who become mentally incapacitated after receiv-
ing the death sentence.' In addition, "[i]ncreased public support for
the death penalty and the growing number of executions indicate that
the issue of competency to be executed will be raised more frequent-
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
7. Id. at 417. See also Ebrahim J. Kermani, M.D. & Jay E. Kantor, M.D.,
Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: The Landmark Supreme Court Cases and
Their Ethical Implications for the Profession, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. LAW
95 (1994).
8. See generally Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239 (1991) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
9. See infra pp. 113-16.
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ly in the legal system."'" Thus, the Supreme Court's refusal to fully
define Ford's constitutional parameters combined with the increasing
number of condemned inmates who are or will become mentally
impaired while on death row, makes it imperative that, in order to
comply with the Eighth Amendment, immediate attention be given to
designing a competency-to-execute model that maximizes the proba-
bility that eligible condemned inmates receive the benefit of the
substantive right created in Ford.
The gravity and urgency of this situation is amplified by the fact
that death, an irreversible penalty, demands that those entitled to the
exemption obtain the exemption. Furthermore, by continuing to avoid
and postpone the resolution of these issues, the chances increase that
the mandates established in Ford, "-prohibiting the execution of
mentally incompetent inmates-Furman v. Georgia,'2 -forbidding
the arbitrary and capricious administration of the death penalty-and
Woodson v. North Carolina,' 3-forbidding the unreliable and unpre-
dictable administration of the death penalty-will be violated. Ac-
cordingly, this Article addresses the array of issues that arise when a
revised competency-to-execute plan is required to prevent violations
of a constitutional right.
The first section of this Article provides a brief historical over-
view of the proscription against executing the incompetent and the
proffered rationales. This section also examines key factors contrib-
uting to the increase in the number of mentally dysfunctional con-
demned inmates. Then the Article explores the traditional competen-
cy-to-execute model that remains in use. This analysis will include a
discussion of specific issues, such as: the term used to describe the
requisite mental affliction, how that term is defined in order to iden-
tify who may ultimately benefit from the rule in Ford, what standard
is appropriate to determine whether an inmate is entitled to Ford's
exemption from execution, and the proper consequence after the
protection afforded by Ford is activated. The examination of these
specific issues incorporates an assessment of the problems with the
present competency-to-execute model. This section also examines two
other important problems that emerge from the utilization of the
present scheme: the present scheme's inability to constitutionally
accommodate the issue of restoration of competency; and the current
model's greater propensity to result in decisions that violate the pro-
10. Mark A. Small & Randy K. Otto, Evaluations of Competency to be
Executed, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 146, 147 (June 1991).
11. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 417.
12. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
13. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
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hibition against the arbitrary, capricious, and unpredictable imposition
of the death penalty.
The final section of the Article presents a competency-to-execute
plan designed to comport with the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment and with the rule established in Ford. The proposed
competency-to-execute plan is composed of four critical components.
The first variable disposes of the archaic terms "incompetent" and
"insane" and requires the adoption of an alternative term, such as
"severe mental impairment." The second factor requires that this new
term be adequately and uniformly defined in order to identify those
condemned inmates who may ultimately become members of the
exempted group. The third component requires selecting a standard to
measure the degree of mental incapacitation that is necessary so a
condemned inmate can exercise the substantive right granted in Ford.
The last component proposes an alternative means for the final reso-
lution of cases that satisfy the previous factors. This final section of
the Article includes an analysis of several concerns that might be
raised if the new proposal is adopted.
Thus, this Article advocates the design and implementation of a
proposal to resolve the Eighth Amendment dilemmas left in the wake
of Ford. An additional objective is that the creation and implementa-
tion of this new plan will result in a reduction of the number of
executions that violate not only Ford, but also Furman4 and
Woodson. 5
PART I
L The Prohibition Against Executing Incompetent Condemned Inmates
A. Historical Foundation
In approximately the 13th century, the unlawfulness of executing
the "insane" or "mad" was established. 6 The traditional rule is typi-
cally formulated in the following manner:
14. See infra p. 117.
15. Id.
16. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401 ("For centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced
the execution of the insane"); see, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, The Eight Amendment and
the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 778 (1980)
("it has been a cardinal principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence since the
medieval period that the presently incompetent should not be executed") (citation
omitted); see also Small & Otto, supra note 10, at 146; Ptolemy H. Taylor,
Execution of the "Artificially Competent": Cruel and Unusual?, 66 TUL. L. REV.
1045 (1992).
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if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence [sic]
and . . [i]f after he becomes of nonsane memory execution shall be
stayed7
Five rationales have been historically relied upon to explain the cre-
ation and establishment of this rule. 8 Perhaps the most traditional,
and persuasive, reason is that executing incompetent inmates offends
general notions of humanity. 9 This basis is reinforced by the Su-
preme Court's pronouncement that:
The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"
A second, and popular, reason for this rule is the belief that execut-
ing a "madman" does not successfully achieve deterrence, one of the
alleged rationalizations for the institution and continuation of capital
punishment.2' The essence of this reason is embodied in the follow-
ing statement:
unless that death serves to deter others from committing the same
crime ... there is no deterrent value in executing the insane person
so that his life may be spared without weakening the deterrent effect
of the death penalty'
Although popular, this argument is less persuasive than the former
17. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 24-25 (emphasis added). It warrants
noting that this passage highlights the fact that the jurisprudence in this area
requires that the condemned inmate be "presently incompetent." Therefore, techni-
cally, the condemned inmate must be deemed incompetent at the exact time of
his or her scheduled execution. Thus, under the present remedial scheme, if an
inmate is not presently competent, then the execution is stayed until the inmate's
competency is restored. See Appendix 1; see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 n.5(Powell, J., concurring) (when a condemned inmate is "cured," he or she can be
executed by the State); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the
State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 382-84 (1962).
See infra p. 14.
18. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10; Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at
382-89; Daniel J. Broderick, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533, 535-
36 n.12 (1979); Larkin, supra note 16, at 778-79; Taylor, supra note 16, at
1050-52; see also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16-20 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
19. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 407; Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 17 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at 384.
20. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
21. E. Coke, 3 Institutes 6 (6th ed. 1680). See Ford, 477 U.S. at 407;
Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 17; Hazard and Louisell, supra note 17, at 384; Broderick,
supra note 18, at 535; Larkin, supra note 16, at 778 n.62; Taylor, supra note
16, at 1049.
22. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at 384-85 (citations omitted) (empha-
sis added).
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argument because it is difficult to comprehend how punishment's
general deterrence goal would be lessened simply because the indi-
vidual being executed is incompetent. Presumably, the condemned
inmate's incompetency would not negatively effect the public's
awareness and understanding that the condemned inmate is being
executed for the commission of a capital offense. Thus, given that
the public's ability to connect the crime with the punishment remains
unscathed, it is difficult to understand how the Ford rule undermines
the successfulness of the deterrent component of the death penaltyY
The third, and more modem, rationale is related to the deterrent
rationale. 4 It is probably the most honest and accurate reason for
the retention of this rule. This rationale stems from the retribution
purpose of punishment: Whereby the decision to impose the death
sentence allegedly reflects the public's conclusion that not only was a
heinous crime committed, but also that the perpetrator should be
made to "suffer" for committing the crime, be able to "feel" the
consequences of his or her unlawful action, and be "conscious" when
receiving his or her punishment.' However, if the condemned in-
mate is incompetent, then successfully achieving this goal is frus-
trated because the condemned may not be sufficiently cognizant of
the execution, may not be able to consciously connect any suffering
experienced from the execution to the commission of the crime,
and/or may not be able to comprehend the reasons for his or her
appointment with death. Consequently, the punishment exact-
ed-death--"has a 'lesser value' than that of the crime for which he
is to be punished."'  Accordingly, the value of the retribution ra-
tionale for capital punishment would be diminished if the condemned
inmate did not sufficiently possess his or her mental faculties at the
designated time.
Religious concerns provide the roots for the fourth rationale.
Historically, it was thought that "executing a presently incompetent
prisoner rob[s] him of any chance to make his peace with his Mak-
er. '27 This position essentially espouses the belief "that it is unchari-
23. Of course, the goal of specific deterrence is satisfied because the
inmate's execution precludes him or her from committing future crimes.
24. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 408.
25. See Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 55-56 (1993) (retribution is one
of the justifications for the death penalty); Matthew S. Collins, Involuntarily
Medicating Condemned Incompetents for the Purpose of Rendering Them Sane
and Thereby Subject to Execution, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1229, 1238 (1992); Hazard
& Louisell, supra note 17, at 386; Taylor, supra note 16, at 1051.
26. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 407 (quoting Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Charles
Bateman, 11 How. St. Tr. 474, 475 (T. Howell ed. 1816)); see also Hazard &
Louisell, supra note 17, at 387.
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table to dispatch an offender 'into another world, when he is not of
a capacity to fit himself for it."2 An interesting, and final, rationale
is the view that "a madman is punished by his madness alone."29
Pursuant to this basis, the need to execute the incompetent con-
demned inmate is extinguished because insanity in itself sufficiently
punishes the offender.
As a reflection of this common law tradition, all jurisdictions
with the death penalty3" adopted this rule. It was not, however, until
1986 that the United States Supreme Court constitutionalized this
ancient canon by holding that executing the mentally incompetent"
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment.32 Although this substantive axiom
was constitutionalized, the Court's opinion in Ford primarily focussed
on whether or not the procedures used by Florida to determine the
petitioner's competency passed muster under the federal Constitu-
tion.33 In fact, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, noted that
the Ford case presented two questions to be resolved: The first was
to determine the meaning of insanity in the context of execution and
the second was to determine what procedures the states must fol-
low. 4 He went on to note that the majority failed to address the
28. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing Hawles, supra note 27); see also Hazard
& Louisell, supra note 17, at 387-88.
29. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 24.
30. See Appendix 1. Only the following jurisdictions do not have the death
penalty: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District
of Columbia. Dieter, supra note 3.
31. It warrants noting that the terms "incompetent" and "insane" are used
interchangeably to describe the status of the individuals that the Supreme Court
desired to protect by its ruling in Ford. Although the Court never expressly
made this pronouncement, the language used in the opinion supports this con-
clusion. For example, although the Florida statute at issue expressly uses the term
"incompetency," the Supreme Court, when assessing the constitutionality of
Florida's statue, uses the term "insane." Ford, 477 U.S. at 408. In addition, when
referring to the statute and to the petitioner's mental capacity, Florida officials
consistently used the word "competency," while the Court continued to use the
term "insane." Id. Thus, these facts suggest that the Court views these two terms
as interchangeable. See also Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam)
(incompetent and insane used interchangeably); Fisher v. Oklahoma, 845 P.2d
1272, 1275 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (same); Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency,
Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361, 362 n.4
(1994).
The Ford opinion, however, failed to supply a definition of these terms in
the fitness for execution context. See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at 394-
95. See also infra pp. 12-15.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Ford, 477 U.S. at 409.
33. Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Small & Otto, supra note 10, at 148.
34. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417.
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first issue.35 Thus, the Court failed to address the more substantive
facets of the right necessary to develop a comprehensive substantive
competency-to-execute policy. 6 As a result, the states were left to
maneuver in this area equipped with little more than a general man-
date prohibiting the execution of incompetent individuals 37 and were
not provided with guidelines or rules pertaining to what is specifical-
ly required in order to fulfill the Court's objective that those con-
demned inmates who the Court anticipated would be protected by the
Ford rule would actually receive that protection. The gravity of this
problem, due to the lack of guidance, is exacerbated because of the
increase in the death row population and the increase in the number
of inmates who become incompetent and thus, might be able to
properly claim this exemption from execution.
B. Increases in the Number of Mentally Incompetent Condemned
Inmates
As long ago as 1950, Justice Frankfurter recognized the reality
of the interrelationship between incompetency and incarceration on
death row when he noted that "the onset of insanity while awaiting
execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon."3 One
study, that reinforces Justice Frankfurter's observation, estimated that,
at some time while on death row, at least fifty percent of Florida's
condemned inmates became incompetent after receiving the death
penalty.39 More recently, Justice Marshall reiterated the importance
of this phenomenon.' In concluding that there was a strong likeli-
hood that death row conditions significantly contribute towards an in-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 404, 409-19.
37. Id. at 399; Appendix 1 illustrates this consequence as it demonstrates
the diverse approaches courts have taken in implementing Ford. As Appendix 1
and this Article reveal, the present situation, in terms of determining mental
fitness to be executed, does not reflect a national Eighth Amendment rule, but a
decision to kill that is a function of which state imposed the death sentence.
38. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
see also Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr., M.D. & James H. Panton, M.A., Inmate
Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 81
(1972); Dorothy Otnow Lewis, M.D. et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and
Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States,
143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 840, 844 (1986); Taylor, supra note 16, at 1049
("The problem of inmates becoming incompetent while awaiting execution is not
a new one"). See generally Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psy-
chology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 141 (1991).
39. See Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and
Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35, 42-43 (1986).
40. Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting to
denial of cert.).
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crease in the number of incompetent condemned inmates, the Justice
stated that:
The issue in this case is not only unsettled, but is also recurring and
important. The stark realities are that many death row inmates were
afflicted with serious mental impairments before they committed their
crimes and that many more develop such impairments during the ex-
cruciating interval between sentencing and execution.4
Therefore, given the correlation between incarceration on death row
and mental incapacitation, it is not difficult to conclude that with
more than 2,800 individuals presently awaiting to be executed by
their respective states, it is very likely that a significant number of
the members of this group will become mentally incapacitated at
some time during the post-sentencing phase of the capital punishment
process.
The large number of condemned inmates who are or become
incompetent can be attributed to several factors. First, an astounding
number of inmates arrive on death row with pre-existing mental
ailments.42 For many inmates with pre-existing mental disorders the
harsh environment that pervades death row confinement contributes
towards the continued deterioration of their already precarious mental
condition. For example, in State v. Perry, Michael Perry had "a...
history of mental illness,"43 that started long before the commission
of his capital offense. Eventually, the stress and strain from being
incarcerated on death row was more than his fragile mental state
could withstand and his mental condition severely deteriorated." In
41. Id. at 1241 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the facts of the landmark Ford v. Wainwright case provide
an excellent example of the phenomenon noted by Justice Marshall. When Mr.
Ford was tried, convicted, and sentenced in 1974 he did not exhibit any prob-
lems with his mental faculties. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401. It was not until Mr. Ford
had been on death row for approximately eight years that he began to exhibit
bizarre behavior. Id. at 402. His behavior became increasingly worse until he
became extremely delusional and paranoid. Id. It was after his mental condition
underwent this grave transformation that Mr. Ford sought refuge from execution
on the grounds that he was mentally unfit to be executed. Id. at 403.
42. See Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991); State v. Perry, 610
So. 2d 746 (La. 1992); Douglas Mossman, M.D., The Psychiatrist and Execution
Competency: Fording Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 15
n.55 (1992) (providing excellent examples of this phenomenon); see also Lewis,
supra note 38, at 840 (in one study, 6 of the 15 condemned inmates had psychi-
atric illnesses that started prior to incarceration).
43. State v. Perry 610 So. 2d at 748.
44. See id.; see also Douglas Dennis, Medicate to Execute: The Michael
Owen Perry Case, THE ANGOLITE 35 (Jan./Feb. 1993); Douglas Dennis, Con-
demned for Life to Death Row: Michael Owen Perry-Louisiana's Murdering
Madman Waits to 'Get Sane', SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 11, 1993, at 3 (At
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1993, ten years after Mr. Perry killed members of his family, Doug-
las Dennis interviewed Mr. Perry at Angola State Prison in Louisi-
ana. When asked his name, Mr. Perry made the following response:
Well, I've had several names. The first name I heard me called was
Mike. Then it was God, then it was Zewik Ma, then it was Eye, then
it was back to Michael Owen Perry.45
Since his incarceration Mr. Perry's sense of reality has continued to
be negatively affected. One example of this is his belief that he is
"God, Jr."'  Rector v. Clark47 provides another example where a
condemned inmate arrived at death row with a mental illness that
subsequently worsened after confinement on death row. In that in-
stance, Ricky Ray Rector's unbalanced mental condition was known
prior to his murder trials." In fact, the primary indication that Mr.
Rector was plagued by mental instability occurred when he shot
himself in the head before his trial.49 After Mr. Rector was sen-
tenced to death, the psychiatric organic deficiencies resulting from
the wound to his head became increasingly evident."
Since "confinement on death row entails extreme emotional
disturbance,"5 it not only exacerbates inmates' existing psychologi-
cal disorders, but can also activate the onset of mental disorders
among condemned inmates who came on death row without pre-
existing mental afflictions. In one study, for example, researchers
found that many of the participants [condemned inmates] became
"suspicious", "grandiose", "progressively depressed", and "paranoid
after being incarcerated on death row."5 This consequence almost
seems inevitable given that these inmates must live in a "barren and
one point, Perry "shaved off his eyebrows to increase the flow of oxygen to his
brain").
45. Dennis, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., supra note 44, at 3.
46. Dennis, THE ANGOLrrE, supra note 44, at 50.
47. Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991).
48. Id. at 571.
49. Id. Not only did Mr. Rector's potentially fatal self-inflicted gunshot
wound to the head indicate that his psychological problems were severe enough
for him to attempt suicide, but the trauma he received from the gunshot wound
"resulted in the severance of about three inches of the left frontal pole. This type
of wound is commonly referred to as a frontal lobotomy." Id.
50. Despite the evidence of mental incapacity prior to trial and incarceration
and after trial and incarceration, the Eighth Circuit held that Mr. Rector was not
incompetent and, thus, he could be executed by the state of Arkansas. Id. at 572.
For additional information about the Rector case see infra pp. 22-25.
51. Johnson, supra note 38, at 145; see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 407. See
generally Mossman, supra note 42, at 16-18.
52. Harvey Bluestone, M.D., & Carl L. McGahee, M.D., Reaction to Ex-
treme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393
(1962).
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uninviting" 3 environment. Furthermore, conditions fostering positive
mental health among these inmates is virtually non-existent as they
are confined to the "insular world of death row" and are segregated
from the general prison population.' Additional stress is placed on
these inmates because they frequently lose the support and care of
their loved ones." As a result, some of "[tihese prisoners rapidly
retreat into a private psychotic world in which they presume them-
selves free men, exempt from execution." 6 Consequently, the harsh
physical and psychological conditions that condemned inmates must
endure creates a hostile emotional and psychological environment57
that can lead to them becoming mentally incapacitated after being
placed on death row. This is precisely what occurred in Ford v.
Wainwright where, after being incarcerated on death row for eight
years, Mr. Ford began to exhibit unrealistic and bizarre psychological
and behavioral patterns." As was the case with Mr. Ford, this re-
sulting mental incapacity may be of such a magnitude that the right
created in Ford must be granted and protected.
53. Johnson, supra note 38, at 142. Douglas Dennis provides the following
description of Michael Perry: "He's 38 years old and paces tirelessly in his cell,
three steps forward, three steps back. He's pallid and puffy, with the look of
decay that comes from years of cell confinement." Dennis, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., supra note 44, at 3.
54. Johnson, supra note 38, at 142-45; Ward, supra note 39, at 36-38.
55. Johnson, supra note 38, at 142, 147.
56. Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
57. This increased stress level that has the potential of pushing a con-
demned inmate "over the edge" is certainly understandable as: "[t]he inmate who
awaits execution faces a unique and terrible form of emotional stress: 'the antici-
pation of death at a specific moment in time and in a known manner."' Moss-
man, supra note 42, at 15.
Another commentator in the mental health field similarly observed that:
"One of the .. .most stressful of all human experiences is the anticipation of
death at a specific moment in time and in a known manner." Gallemore, supra
note 38, at 81; see also Mossman, supra note 42, at 15; Rochelle Graff
Salguero, Medical Ethics and Competency To Be Executed, 96 YALE L.J. 167,
172 n.33 (1986); Ward, supra note 39, at 42-43. See generally Johnson, supra
note 38, at 141-48.
The conditions these inmates must withstand on a daily basis certainly
explain why condemned inmates would make the following declarations: "I feel
like every day I'm losing part of my mind" and "I'm already walking on a hair-
line of being sane and insane; I could fall either way at any time." Johnson,
supra note 38, at 179-80 (emphasis added).
58. Ford, 477 U.S. at 402:.
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PART II
I. The Present Competency-To-Execute Plan
A. Introduction to the Traditional Competency-To-Execute Scheme
One distinctive approach has been used by the bulk of death
eligible jurisdictions 9 to ensure compliance with the prohibition
against executing mentally incompetent inmates. Analytically, this
approach focusses on responding to a single broad inquiry: Is the
condemned inmate mentally "incompetent" or "insane'?" An affirma-
tive answer conveys the right established in Ford to the condemned
inmate. Conversely, a negative response bars the condemned inmate
from obtaining the shield provided by Ford. Superficially and for-
malistically, this approach to comply with Ford appears sufficient.
However, upon closer scrutiny the inadequacy of this mechanism
becomes apparent. The plan's simplicity is problematic because it
ignores the intrinsic complexity of the general issue posed in defin-
ing a constitutional competency-to-execute plan. In turn, this conse-
quence enables states to avoid confronting and tackling the difficult
issues inherent in ensuring that a mentally incompetent condemned
inmate is not executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Another feature of the traditional competency-to-execute model is
that it collapses two critical substantive dimensions of the issue-i)
the definition of the traditional term "incompetent" and 2) the stan-
dard used to measure "incompetency"-into this single inquiry.
Again, the posture of the inquiry reflects the traditional model's
failure to identify and address what components are required in order
for a competency-to-execute-plan to protect the right established in
Ford. Unfortunately, this failure creates high stakes-the unconstitu-
tional killing of another human being.
When examined from the perspective of general policy concerns
associated with the death penalty, the current model contains another
notable flaw; namely, that its lack of uniformity possesses the poten-
tial to violate not only Ford, but also the Eighth Amendment prin-
ciples embodied in Furman,60 Johnson v. Mississippi,61 and
Woodson. 2 In Furman, the Court stated that it was unconstitutional
to administer the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious man-
59. See Appendix 1.
60. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
61. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988).
62. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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ner. The presence of these diverse approaches to implementing
competency-to-execute plans, due to the lack of uniformity in the
manner in which the scope is defined and due to the lack of a single
standard selected to measure the requisite level of functionability,
threaten to violate this directive because the absence of a cohesive
competency-to-execute plan can undoubtedly result in the execution
of those who are incompetent.
Similarly, the death sentence is required to be implemented in a
reliable and predictable manner.' The complete lack of uniformity
in the present administration of the competency-to execute plans and
the traditional model's failure to deconstruct the variables that need
to be considered when determining this issue create an environment
where Woodson is destined to be violated. In the final analysis, the
traditional model miserably fails as it does not provide a uniform
multi-faceted inquiry in order to provide a constitutional response to
the multi-faceted competency-to-execute issue.
B. The Operation and Limitations of the Specific Components of
the Present Plan
The integral component of the traditional and current competen-
cy-to-execute plan is embodied in the terms "incompetency" and
"insanity."' Most jurisdictions have traditionally used these terms'
to determine who is protected under Ford. Thus, under the present
competency-to-execute approach, the inquiry essentially requires en-
suring that the correct terminology is used to determine which con-
demned inmates qualify for the right created in Ford. However, the
terms are simply used; a definition is not provided. Therefore, what-
ever definition of these terms has been implicitly adopted is col-
lapsed into the first and single inquiry noted above-is the con-
demned inmate "incompetent" or "insane"? However, in order to
ensure the comprehensive and consistent67 application of Ford's
Eighth Amendment requirement, it is imperative to adopt uniform
terminology that will identify with specificity those eligible to be
included in this group so that Ford will not be applied in an
underinclusive, and thus, unconstitutional manner.
The lack of a definition of the terms used to categorize eligible
inmates is primarily due to the Supreme Court's failure to provide
63. Id. at 305.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 21.
66. See Appendix 1.
67. See supra pp. 116-17.
[V'ol. 14:1
1994] COMPETENCY AND THE EXECUTION OF CONDEMNED INMATES 119
definitions for these terms.6" The failure to provide these definitions
has allowed the states to exercise their discretion in developing defi-
nitions that supposedly comport with the prohibition against execut-
ing condemned inmates who are mentally unfit for execution. This
shortcoming emphasizes a critical limitation of the present competen-
cy-to-execute plan: the failure to require the application of a uniform
standard of mental acuity further undermines the ability to success-
fully identify condemned inmates entitled to this protection in order
to fully guarantee that the right established in Ford will not be vio-
lated.
Lastly, the traditional model does not contain a remedial feature.
In fact, this issue is typically excluded from the traditional competen-
cy-to-execute analysis and is usually handled as a separate and inde-
pendent issue. Nonetheless, there has been some protocol in this area.
Once a condemned inmate has been declared incompetent, the usual
consequence is to stay the execution for the duration of the period of
incompetency. However, despite the substantial use of this option, it
is not mandated by the rule in Ford. Ford simply prohibits the exe-
cution of the mentally incompetent and does not place any limitation
on the manner in which the issue is conclusively resolved.69 Thus,
imposing a stay of execution is not the sole means of remedying a
situation invoking a substantive right that is protected by the Eighth
Amendment. Furthermore, in addition to not being required, the pres-
ent remedy may be ineffective in ensuring that those condemned
inmates targeted to receive the full protection afforded by Ford will
actually receive it7 . This concern is brought to the forefront when
the traditional remedy-the stay of the execution-is examined in
conjunction with the restoration of competency issue.
C. The Interaction Between The Restoration of Competency and
the Traditional Competency-To-Execute Approach
As previously noted, under the traditional model, if a condemned
inmate regains his or her sanity, then the stay of execution is
lifted7' and the state is free to proceed with the execution."' As
68. Since its decision in Ford, the Court has never heard a case that would
have provided it with an opportunity to clarify what precisely is meant by "in-
competency" and to address the subsidiary constitutional issues in the context of
mental fitness for execution.
69. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416.
70. See infra pp. 132-39.
71. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text. See generally Appendix
1.
72. The majority of jurisdictions still employ this remedy-extinguishment of
the stay of execution-once the condemned inmate's competency has been re-
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Justice Powell noted in Ford: "[t]he only question raised is not
whether, but when, his execution may take place."73 The majority of
jurisdictions still employ this remedy-relinquishing the stay of exe-
cution--once the condemned inmate's competency has been restored.
The restoration of competency is a compelling and important
issue because it renders the exemption provided by Ford inoperative.
Consequently, the subject inmate is once again death eligible. There
are some cases where the condemned inmate will never regain74 his
or her mental competency, and thus, the issue of restoration of com-
petency, within the context of a competency-to-execute plan, does not
arise. This was the situation encountered in State v. Perry.5 Like a
significant number of condemned inmates, Michael Perry entered
death row with a history of mental disorders.76 After being placed
on death row, his mental condition considerably deteriorated.7 Sub-
sequently, it was discovered that Mr. Perry suffers from an incurable
schizo-affective psychological disorder that renders him permanently
incompetent.78 Under the traditional competency-to-execute plan, Mr.
Perry will continue to retain the protection afforded by Ford and
thus, will remain exempted from execution.79
stored. See Appendix 1.
73. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added); see also Hazard & Louisell,
supra note 17, at 383, 385 (if the inmate recovers, then execution follows).
74. Some argue, however, that it is a rare or infrequent occasion for a con-
demned inmate to never regain competency. See Hazard & Louisell, supra note
17, at 385. However, even Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Ford,
acknowledged that there are occasions when "some defendants may lose their
mental faculties and never regain them, and thus avoid execution altogether."
Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 n.5.
It warrants noting that scenarios involving condemned inmates who never
regain their competency are more likely to increase as the number of individuals
sentenced to death continues to experience such extraordinary growth. For exam-
ple, the stressful living environment to which these individuals are subjected, see
supra p. 113, is one factor that supports this contention. In addition, with an
increase in the number of incoming condemned inmates who have pre-existing
mental illnesses it is plausible to contend that more than "some" condemned
inmates might never regain competency. Additional support for this contention is
found in some state statutes governing the competency-to-execute schemes that
have provisions contemplating the existence of condemned inmates who never
regain competency. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 75A (1994); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29.2537 (1993).
75. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
76. Id.; see also supra p. 114; Dennis, THE ANGOLrrE, supra note 44, at
35-36.
77. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 773.
78. Id. at 748-49.
79. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 (incompetent inmates cannot be executed); see
also Dennis, THE ANGOLITE, supra note 44, at 47 (noting that although Mr.
Perry will continue to be incarcerated on death row, he will never be executed).
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However, technically, as previously noted, once an inmate's
competency is restored, then his or her status changes from "death
ineligible" to "death eligible." Thus, the crucial issue and focus of
concern is on determining whether a condemned inmate has regained
his or her mental competency. For example, it must be determined
how, if at all, an inmate's treatment plan that stabilizes the inmate's
behavior or reduces the rate or degree of mental deterioration can
effect the inmate's ability to remain protected by Ford. In other
words, improvements in the condemned's mental condition do not
necessarily constitute the restoration of competency and thus, the
inmate's eligibility to be executed is not automatically reinstated. The
most compelling aspect of the restoration of competency issue is
how, if at all, the increasing use of psychotropic drugs8" to treat
mentally disordered condemned inmates impacts the nullification of
the Ford exemption.
One approach to analyzing this dimension of the issue is to
focus on the debate over whether incompetency can be "cured" rather
than simply "treated."8 Two distinctive camps on the "cure" versus
"treatment" debate have emerged. One position contends that incom-
petent condemned inmates can be cured.82 Under this approach, any
improvement in the patient's mental condition would be viewed as a
shift towards the "cure" portion of the competency continuum. Thus,
eventually with the aid of psychotropic drugs a condemned inmate
could conceivably "regain" his or her competency. In contrast to this
position is that advanced by the adherents of the "treatment" ap-
proach. Under this viewpoint, while mentally incompetent condemned
inmates can be "treated," they can never be "cured."83 Thus, im-
80. Psychotropic drugs are used to stabilize the patient and to minimize dis-
turbances. They typically are defined in the following manner:
Antipsychotic medications alter that mysterious area of existence that we
call being. These medications have the potential to fundamentally change
the thought pattern and behavioral pattern of the individual to whom they
are administered. It is impossible to say whether the true individual is the
one presenting the symptomatology described as psychosis, or the individual
that is manifested after the treatment of psychoses. The very essence of
humanity, the foundation of individuality is potentially affected by the ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs.
State v. Baker, 511 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Neb. 1994) (emphasis added); see also
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 (1990).
In modem times, psychotropic medications are frequently viewed as
"wonder drugs" because they can eliminate or reduce numerous symptoms of
mental disorders. For example, the symptoms exhibited by one mentally disturbed
condemned inmate "were less pronounced" after he was administered a psycho-
tropic drug. Taylor, supra note 16, at 1053; Ward, supra note 39, at 36 n.3.
81. See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at 388-89 n.24.
82. Id. at 384.
83. See infra pp. 132-39; Mossman, supra note 42, at 5 n.18.
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provements in the inmate's mental condition can be categorized as
favorable responses to the treatment program or possibly even as
completely repressing the manifestations associated with the mental
ailment. In fact, conceivably, an inmate may receive treatment that
eliminates erratic symptoms, dissipates the adverse effects of the
mental condition, or facilitates them in becoming "less pro-
nounced."' However, obtaining this result does not necessarily
mean that the condemned inmate has been "cured" of the underlying
ailment. As a result, the condemned inmate retains the underlying
mental ailment, Ford remains operative, and the stay of execution
can not be lifted. Thus, the "cure" versus "treatment" debate and
how it impacts death eligibility or ineligibility greatly affects the role
restoration of competency plays in protecting the right granted in
Ford and in assessing the constitutionality of competency-to-execute
plans.
The restoration of competency issue is greatly complicated by
the increasing use of psychotropic drugs to treat mental ailments. As
previously noted, these drugs are frequently used to treat mental
illnesses and disorders that render condemned inmates incompetent85
and complicate the "cure" versus "treatment" positions on whether
competency has been restored and the course of action that flows
from that determination. Thus, if the inmate takes psychotropic drugs
and the symptoms that rendered the inmate incompetent in the first
instance are minimized,86 does the inmate become "cured" and thus,
eligible to be executed? Or, does minimizing symptoms through this
method simply constitute a treatment regime that does not affect the
underlying incompetency? The general consensus on this issue ap-
pears to be that any improvement resulting from the use of psycho-
tropic drugs does not reflect a "cure", but instead is simply a conse-
quence of having a particular "treatment" used in providing medical
attention to a specific ailment. 7
Additional problems develop with the restoration of competency
issue when a mentally incompetent condemned inmate's constitutional
84. Taylor, supra note 16, at 1054 (discussing how the symptoms that man-
ifested from Mr. Perry's mental disorder became less pronounced once he was
treated with Haldol, a psychotropic drug).
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86. Mossman, supra note 42, at 5 n.18 ("The symptoms of mental illness
are often ameliorated by psychotropic medication"); see also Taylor, supra note
16, at 1046.
87. In addition, "health practitioners agree that antipsychotic drugs do not
cure mental illness, but instead provide only temporary relief." Michelle K.
Bachand, Antipsychotic Drugs and the Incompetent Defendant: A Perspective on
the Treatment and Prosecution of Incompetent Defendants, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1059, 1061 (1990); see also Taylor, supra note 16, at 1046.
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right to receive medical treatment is included in the overall com-
petency to execute equation. Providing constitutionally adequate psy-
chiatric medical care may require prescribing psychotropic drugs. If
this is the case, the condemned inmate always has the option of
voluntarily taking the medication. An inmate may refuse to take the
medication, however, and the state may resort to forcible medication.
The Supreme Court, in Washington v. Harper,9 held that an inmate
can be forcibly medicated if the following circumstances exist:
[the inmate] (1) suffers from a "mental disorder" and (2) is "gravely
disabled" or poses a "likelihood of serious harm" to himself, others,
or their property"
Thus, an inmate, including those who are condemned to death, can
be forced to take psychotropic drugs as part of a treatment program.
Herein lies the dilemma. If, by forcibly administering psychotropic
drugs the inmate's symptoms subside, is the condemned inmate
"cured" of his or her incompetency and thus, no longer shielded by
Ford? Or, alternatively, has the condemned inmate only been "treat-
ed" for a mental ailment and his or her "natural state" remains in-
competent thereby precluding a finding of competency? Under the
latter viewpoint, the medication is considered to simply have had a
positive effect on the inmate's ailment and has not altered the orig-
inal incompetency designation which had been shielding the inmate
from execution. Accordingly, it must be determined whether the use
of psychotropic drugs simply alleviates adverse psychological symp-
toms or whether the drugs render the inmate "artificially competent"
or "synthetically sane" which is sufficient to reactivate the inmate's
eligibility to be executed9' without violating Ford. The resolution of
this issue is largely contingent upon how the jurisdiction treats this
restoration of competency issue and whether the restoration is desig-
nated as a "cure" or as a "treatment."92
The parameters and intricacies of this issue are aptly presented
in State v. Perry.93 There, the condemned, Michael Perry, had an
88. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In fact, if a distressed inmate
did not receive appropriate and prompt psychiatric or other medical attention,
there could be a successful suit against the prison for deliberate indifference to
the inmate's medical needs. So, the institution has an incentive to "treat" men-
tally ill or impaired condemned inmates.
89. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
90. Id. at 215.
91. These terms are used interchangeably and denote a degree of compe-
tency that is created by the use of psychotropic drugs; see Taylor, supra note 16,
at 1046; see also Byers, supra note 31, at 377.
92. See supra pp. 121-22.
93. State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989), cert. granted, 494 U.S.
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extensive history of mental trouble that long preceded the commis-
sion of his crime.' Prior to his conviction and incarceration for
murder, Mr. Perry had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and on sev-
eral occasions had been committed to mental institutions.95 Despite
evidence of substantial mental problems, Mr. Perry was deemed com-
petent to stand trial. At his trial he was convicted of capital murder
and subsequently received a death sentence as the penalty for his
offense.96 While waiting to be executed, Mr. Perry's mental condi-
tion continued to deteriorate. In fact, it deteriorated to such a degree
that medical experts concluded that he "suffer[ed] from an incurable
schizoaffective disorder that causes his days to be a series of halluci-
nations, delusional and disordered thinking, incoherent speech, and
manic behavior."' At this point, his counsel argued that Mr. Perry's
mental condition exempted him from execution pursuant to the right
recognized in Ford. The state, however, disagreed with this conten-
tion.
Eventually, the court allowed the state correctional officials to
circumvent the prohibition established in Ford by medicating Mr.
Perry, forcibly if necessary," in order to render him competent to
be executed. Apparently, "Perry was competent for execution only
while he was being maintained by antipsychotic drugs in the form of
Haldol." With the court's approval, the state decided to forcibly
medicate Mr. Perry with psychotropic drugs in order to render him
mentally fit for execution."° However, his attorney objected to such
an execution because Mr. Perry's competency had been synthetically
"restored" by forcing him to take psychotropic drugs.' After Mr.
Perry lost his case in the state courts, the United States Supreme
Court eventually remanded the case so the trial court could reconsid-
er the issue in light of the Court's decision in Washington v. Harp-
er. 2 Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the state's
1015, vacated and remanded, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
94. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748. Michael Perry was charged with the murder
of family members. For more information on Mr. Perry's crime see Dennis, THE
ANGOLrTE, supra note 44, at 36-38.
95. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. ,
100. Id; see also Dennis, THE ANGOLTE, supra note 44, at 39. It is inter-
esting to note that when the case was argued before the United States' Supreme
Court, Justice Marshall was so outraged at Louisiana's audacity that he suggested
that the state simply give Mr. Perry enough Haldol to kill him. Dennis, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., supra note 44.
101. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748.
102. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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medicate-to-execute plan violated the state constitution.103
There are numerous reasons why this holding is appropriate and
more importantly, more than likely promulgates the constitutional
right guaranteed by Ford. Obviously, the administration of the psy-
chotropic medication abated the severity of Mr. Perry's mental af-
fliction." Thus, one view is that the improvement in his mental
capacity was the result of "treatment"'0" and thus, he remains ineli-
gible to be executed. The court seems to implicitly adopt this posi-
tion when it held that Louisiana's constitution forbids executing Mr.
Perry while forcing him to take psychotropic drugs that temporarily
diminish his symptoms when his "underlying insanity can never be
permanently cured or quelled."'" Thus, improvements in cognitive
abilities or assistance abilities do not necessarily rid the individual of
his or her mental impairment. As a result, establishing "synthetic
sanity" or "artificial competency" may be insufficient to restore com-
petency to the degree necessary to remove the bar created by Ford.
Another critical consideration associated with the "cure" versus
"treatment" approaches to the restoration of competency is that it
would be virtually impossible to discern-the state's motive for forc-
ibly medicating the condemned inmate. For example, is the state
forcibly medicating a condemned inmate because it is legitimately
concerned for the inmate's "well-being"? Or, does the forcible medi-
cation reflect an improper motive, such as attempting to restore the
condemned's competency so the stay of execution can be lifted? It
would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to decipher the
state's motivation in order to determine whether the "restoration"
would permit execution. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that other
jurisdictions will be as honest as Louisiana: the state was quite can-
did about the fact that it wanted to medicate Mr. Perry solely in
order to render him mentally fit for execution.0 7 Given that there is
a real risk that a state might cite an "appropriate" reason for forcible
medication, such as providing medical care as required by the Eighth
Amendment, while refusing to disclose the real reason, wanting to
make the inmate death qualified, whether the restoration of compe-
tency issue is approached from the "cure" or the "treatment" perspec-
tive plays a pivotal role in assessing the constitutionality of a compe-
tency-to-execute plan.
103. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 771.
104. Id. at 749.
105. See supra pp. 121-22.
106. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748.
107. See Dennis, supra note 45.
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D. Conclusion
While the present competency-to-execute model is deceivingly
simple, it has several notable drawbacks that frustrate efforts to suc-
cessfully protect the right granted in Ford and to adhere to the con-
stitutional principles embodied in Furman, and Woodson."8 The
major problems include: the continued use of the narrow and impre-
cise term, "incompetency" to describe the class of inmates who
might ultimately be protected; the absence of a uniform definition for
the term defining the members of the protected class; the absence of
an uniform standard to measure whether or not the condemned in-
mate possesses the requisite mental capacity; and the myriad of is-
sues pertaining to how the restoration of competency impacts the
substantive right granted in Ford. Furthermore, it is questionable
whether the existing competency-to-execute format operates in a
manner that ensures that the Eighth Amendment mandates from
Furman"° and Woodson"' will be enforced.
PART III
I. An Alternative Competency-To-Execute Plan
A. Introduction
Alternatives to the traditional competency-to-execute model exist.
One obvious option would be to abolish this longstanding exemp-
tion."' However, given the longevity of the rule and its entrench-
ment in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, vis-a-vis Ford, it is un-
likely that this option is available. Therefore, another alternative must
be developed. Before designing such a new alternative it is necessary
to assess the necessity for such a plan.
B. It is Necessary to Implement a New Competency-To-
Execute Plan
The lack of a uniform competency-to-execute plan undermines
the constitutional administration of the death penalty. This prevalent
absence of uniformity in the present competency-to-execute format
creates a scenario where there is a significant risk that executions
108. See supra p. 117.
109. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
110. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
111. See Salguero, supra note 57, at 184.
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will be arbitrary and capricious and violative of Ford. The Rec-
tor"2 case more than aptly emphasizes this need for a cohesive,
comprehensive, and uniform plan.
Prior to his trial for murder, the defendant, Mr. Ricky Ray Rec-
tor, shot himself in the head.' The severe head injury he received
was, in terms of its magnitude, equivalent to a frontal lobotomy."'
Despite the existence of this grave injury,"' the trial court found
him competent to stand trial."6 Ultimately, Mr Rector was convict-
ed of murder and received a death sentence. "7 Given the severity
of the damage to Mr. Rector's brain, his counsel filed a petition
seeking to bar Mr. Rector's execution on the grounds that to do so
would violate Ford. Disagreeing, the Arkansas court held that Mr.
Rector was competent to be executed."' It is important to note that
the lower court's ruling was dependent upon its adoption of the
narrow Powell standard"9 to measure Mr. Rector's competency for
execution. This limited standard only required that Mr. Rector be
aware that he was going to die and why he was going to die.20
On the other hand, if the lower court had followed the advice of
other mental health officials, who advocated for applying the broader
two-prong standard' to measure Mr. Rector's competency-to-be
executed, then Mr. Rector would have benefitted from the protection
provided by Ford." In other words, if the court had not selected a
narrow, and potentially underinclusive, standard Mr. Rector would
not have been executed. Thus, the arbitrary outcomes evidenced by
the lack of uniform mental fitness plans creates a substantial risk that
those who, pursuant to Ford, should not be executed will be execut-
ed." Undoubtedly, the risk of irreversible unconstitutional activity
112. Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 570 (8th Cir. 1991).
113. Id. at 571.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 571 n.2.
116. Id. at 571.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). For a detailed description of the Powell
test see infra p. 135.
120. Rector, 923 F.2d at 572-73. See also infra pp. 135-37.
121. See infra p. 136.
122. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Arkansas
court's decision. Mr. Rector was executed by the state of Arkansas on January
31, 1992. Telephone Interview with Arkansas Capital Resource Center, Little
Rock, Arkansas (Aug. 31, 1994).
123. It warrants reemphasizing exactly what transpired in the Rector case.
The absence of uniformity which allowed for the indiscriminate selection of one
standard over another standard forestalled Mr. Rector's chances of reaching and
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occurring underscores the need for a new competency-to-execute
plan.
The urgency2 4 of adopting an appropriate constitutional compe-
tency-to-execute plan is increased by the fact that presently greater
numbers of condemned inmates become mentally infirm while resid-
ing in the death house."z Accordingly, there is a corresponding in-
crease in the number of condemned inmates who may qualify for the
Ford exemption. However, a substantial degree of uncertainty sur-
rounds the determination of who actually reaps the benefits from the
constitutional right guaranteed in Ford. For example, as Rector re-
vealed, there exists a disagreement'26 regarding which standard gov-
erns this situation. 27 Given these considerations, it is very likely
that, due to the use of an inappropriate plan, states will continue vio-
lating Ford's prohibition against executing the mentally incompe-
tent.'28 Thus, it is imperative that the United States Supreme Court
immediately'29 intervene and establish uniform constitutional stan-
obtaining the sanctuary provided by Ford. If the court had adopted the broader
standard, then Ford would have been genuinely complied with and the petitioner
would not have been barred from having that substantive right granted and pro-
tected. Not only does the tactic followed by the courts exemplify how the lack
of a uniform plan creates the potential for this shocking disparity in outcomes,
but also can result in the violation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution be-
cause what Justice Brennan noted was prohibited-that "the incompetent would
never be executed"-is precisely what occurred when the state of Arkansas exe-
cuted Mr. Rector on January 31, 1992. Id.
124. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 537 (1968), the Court noted that
timing can be one factor indicating the necessity of making changes in a partic-
ular area of constitutional law.
125. See supra pp. 113-16.
126. Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991); see infra pp. 134-37.
127. See Rector, 923 F.2d at 572-73.
128. As Justice Brennan noted, "the incompetent would never be executed."
Johnson v. Cabana, 481 U.S. 1061, 1063 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting to denial
of cert.) (emphasis added).
129. Not only can the court act immediately but it also has the power to do
so. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court held that "[iut is simply
not yet the time to write into the Constitution formulas" addressing mental health
issues. Id. at 537 (emphasis added). This statement embodies the Court's assump-
tion that, when the time comes, it will have the power to devise uniform stan-
dards for standards to be applied to cases involving mental health issues. See
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (court addressed the issue of what
standards were constitutionally required in order to forcibly medicate an inmate).
Thus, the Court envisions its ability to act in this area.
Furthermore, the Court's opinion in Powell did not suggest that the Court
would be forever prohibited from devising a comprehensive program in an area
involving mental health issues, such as this one. Rather, the Court seems to
contemplate that such a time will occur, but it simply had not yet occurred at
the time it was deciding the case at hand. Consequently, in accordance with the
Court's own words, the present moment is appropriate for developing and imple-
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dards for the implementation of the competency-to-execute plans.
This is the only remedy that will ensure compliance with the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment.
Perhaps most importantly is that the need for the Court to inter-
vene, devise, and adopt a new comprehensive competency-to-execute
plan is intensified by the fact that death is final, it is the ultimate
sanction. If incompetent condemned inmates, who obviously cannot
be resurrected, are executed in contravention of the rule created in
Ford,' then immediate action' is necessary in order to ensure
that constitutionally protected individuals are not wrongfully subjected
to this final and ultimate penalty.'
I. The Proposed Competency-To-Execute Scheme
In order to achieve maximum effectiveness from overhauling the
existing competency-to-execute plan it is imperative to include sev-
eral key components into the scheme. The new approach must incor-
porate the following: 1) finding a new term to substitute for the
presently used terms of "incompetency" and "insanity" in order to
assist in identifying those inmates who may ultimately benefit from
the holding in Ford; 2) defining this new term in a manner that
comports with the principles and right advanced in Ford; 3) selecting
a uniform standard to determine whether a condemned inmate's men-
tal incapacity triggers the protection granted in Ford; 4) creating a
uniform measure of mental acuity and; 5) selecting the appropriate
menting changes to the competency-to-execute plans.
Of course, the Supreme Court unequivocally has the power to make the
specific alterations necessary to create a uniform and constitutional competency-to-
execute plan. It warrants noting that in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978),
the Court specifically noted that in administering the Eighth Amendment, the
Amendment's parameters exceeded "more than physically barbarous punishments."
Id. at 685. This supports the conclusion that the Court's power under the Eighth
Amendment is not simply limited to declaring which types of punishments are
cruel and excessive, but also extends to the development and reinforcement of
regulatory powers in order to ensure that a substantive right granted under the
Eighth Amendment is not violated. This latter observation reflects the fact that
the Court, vis-a-vis the Constitution, should be allowed to "place[] . . . a sub-
stantive restriction on the State's power to take the life of an insane man."
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 15 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Thus, as
an auxiliary power, the Court has the power to revamp the present competency-
to-execute plans in order to ensure that the rights in Ford are properly granted
and enforced.
130. See, e.g., supra note 123.
131. See supra pp. 126-29.
132. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). "The
penalty of death . . . is unique in its total irrevocability." Id. at 306.
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means of finally remedying the situation once an inmate is shielded
by Ford.
A. Adopting An Alternative Term
Since Ford prohibits the execution of condemned inmates whose
mental capacity.fails to meet a requisite level, this first step requires
selecting a term or phrase to aid in identifying these inmates. Histor-
ically, the terms "incompetent" and "insanity" have been used to
identify and describe those granted protection under Ford.'33 How-
ever, not only are these terms archaic, but they are also an imprecise
means of initially identifying the members of the group that Ford
envisions protecting.
There is a wide range of terms from which to choose in order
to aid in resolving the ultimate decision: which inmates are incompe-
tent, and thus, protected from being executed. The potential choices
range from broad terms,"s such as "mental disorder," "mental im-
pairment," or "mental affliction," to narrower and more specific
terms, 35 such as "mental illness," "mental retardation,' ,3 6 or "psy-
chiatric disorder." Ultimately, the decision as to which term or phrase
to adopt will be contingent upon the manner in which Ford should
be interpreted. For example, if the ambit of the protection granted by
Ford is understood to be narrow; and thus, should only shelter a few
condemned inmates, then it would be appropriate to select a narrow
term. If this course of action was followed, while Ford, arguably,
would be complied with, undoubtedly fewer condemned inmates
would be eligible to benefit from the rule. However, should that
understanding of Ford be incorrect, then the selection of a narrower
phrase would increase the risk that the chosen implementation of the
constitutional mandate will be underinclusive. This consequence,
understandably, could too easily mean that a condemned inmate who
is actually protected under Ford would be executed' 37 in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the selection of a narrow term not
only frustrates the ability to comply with the rule announced in
Ford, but also undermines one of the primary rationales for the rule:
133. See supra note 31.
134. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 552.060
(1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-201 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001
(1994); Collins, supra note 25, at 1232 n.21.
135. See Commonwealth of Pa. v. Moon, 117 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 1955) (de-
fining mental illness); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2-130 (West 1992).
136. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-
220 (Law Co-op. 1993); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retard-
ed Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1985).
137. See supra note 123.
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that executing the incompetent is morally unjust. 3 1
If a broader term or phrase is selected to describe the character-
istics that individuals protected by Ford must have, then the number
of condemned inmates who might be shielded under Ford increases.
One consequence of this increase is that it will create a situation
improving the chances that the rule and spirit of Ford will be fol-
lowed and enforced. Thus, the selection of a broader term reduces
the possibility that the competency-to-execute plan will result in
underexclusivity. Accordingly, errors in its application are less likely
to result in actual violations of the Eighth Amendment. While argu-
ably the more expansive term could widen the scope of the Ford
exemption beyond what the Court initially envisioned; given the
gravity of the sentence 39 and the increase in the number of con-
demned inmates whose mental capacity deteriorates while impris-
oned,"4 the use of a broader phrase to describe the eligible indi-
viduals is more likely to ensure that the Ford exclusion is in fact
applied to those situations in which the Court contemplated that it
would apply.14'
Accordingly, the broader terms and phrases must be assessed in
order to select one to assist in accomplishing the goals embodied in
this new competency-to-execute scheme. The terms "mental disorder"
and "mental defect" are probably the broadest tests. However, they
may be too broad and vague because they can be construed to in-
clude such ailments as: anxiety disorders, depression, phobias, and
attention deficit disorders, which, arguably, are mental ailments that
do not involve the severity of mental disability that the Court be-
lieves warrants a reprieve from impending execution.'42 "Mental im-
pairment" is another fairly broad term that could be adopted. This
term is broad enough to encompass discrete types of mental incapac-
ities, 43 such as mental retardation, psychiatric disorders, and or-
ganic brain damage. This feature would be more likely to ensure that
the designated class of inmates will avoid present execution."
138. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986).
139. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) ("The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment,
not in degree but kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability."); Trimble v. Mary-
land, 603 A.2d 899, 900 (1992) ("Death is the ultimate penalty").
140. See supra pp. 113-16.
141. See generally Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991).
142. Interview with Professor Lane Veltkamp, University of Kentucky College
of Medicine, Psychiatry Department, in Lexington, Ky. (July 18, 1994) [hereinaf-
ter Veltkamp]; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-102(6) (1993).
143. See. supra pp. 129-30.
144. In addition, the significant concerns attached to the selection of a nar-
row term for the requisite mental acuity level are more likely to be minimized if
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW
However, unlike the other options, it's breadth is arguably mini-
mized by including the term "impairment" because it reflects the fact
that the functional aspect of the issue of competency-to-execute is
considered as well. This feature comports with the spirit of Ford
which seems to require that the condemned inmate be functionally
disabled to some degree.'45 Furthermore, the use of the word "im-
pairment" also reflects the notion that the qualifying ailment should
be, and will be, substantial; rather than, de minimis.' 46 These con-
siderations should offset any charges that the standard is overly
broad; and thus, extends beyond what is necessary in order to iden-
tify those condemned inmates who the Court envisioned would be
protected by Ford.'47 In sum, it is more likely that the constitution-
al right set forth in Ford will be observed if the broader "mental im-
pairment" phrase is substituted for the outmoded terms "insanity" and
"incompetency."
The final aspect of the term used to describe those who will
ultimately be eligible for the reprieve, is to determine the magnitude
of the ailment that is necessary to invoke Ford's exemption. The
Court in Ford appears to have envisioned the rule applying to situa-
tions where a condemned inmate's mental disability is relatively
severe. Ford itself provides support for this contention. In Ford, the
defendant's mental capacity disintegrated to such a degree that he
was hearing voices, thought that his execution and others would not
be carried out, and that some outside force was attempting to sexual-
ly molest his female relatives.'48 The severity, magnitude and nature
of these symptoms, as manifestations of his mental ailment, support
the conclusion that the Court contemplated that in order for a mental
order to trigger the available protection, it must be substantial or
a broader term is adopted.
145. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986).
146. See generally id.
147. The adoption of such terms as "mental disorder" and "mental illness"
by some jurisdictions is evidence that there might already be a movement to
broaden the scope of Ford's protection by adopting new terms. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 16-90-506 (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406 (1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 11-10-4-3 (West 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A (1991); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001 (1994); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-23-220 (Law. Co-Op. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
23A-27A-24 (1994); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 46-01 (West 1994); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-177.1 (Michie 1994). While these updated terms certainly
sound less archaic than the term "insanity" and less derogatory than the term
"incompetent", this minor change in semantics does not disguise the fact that the
term, when applied, probably remains as constrained as its predecessor terms.
Again, this semantical change does nothing more than provide additional opportu-
nities for violations of the prohibitions and principles embodied in Ford.
148. Ford, 477 U.S. at 402.
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significant. Therefore, the proposed plan will apply Ford to situations
where the condemned inmate suffers from a "severe mental impair-
ment."
149
B. Defining the Term "Severe Mental Impairment"
Successfully achieving the Ford mandate necessitates developing
and implementing' an expansive definition of the operative
term-"severe mental impairment"-"[b]ecause the Court left the
definition of incompetency open, [which] ... subjects the protected
class to erosion beyond that found at common law." ' Given the
constitutional stature of the prohibition announced in Ford and the ir-
reversibility of the sentence if an error is made,'52 a more compre-
hensive definition of "severe mental impairment" should be adopt-
ed. '3 It is only by adopting an expansive and flexible definition of
"severe mental impairment" will there ever be any assurance that the
right granted in Ford will not be infringed. Thus, incorporating a
more comprehensive definition into the proposed competency-to-exe-
cute plan should reduce the number of situations involving the un-
constitutional execution of a mentally impaired condemned in-
mate."M Accordingly, capturing the complete degree of protection
embodied in Ford requires adopting, at the minimum, a definition of
"severe mental impairment" that includes organically caused losses of
mental acuity,"15 psychiatric based losses,"5 6 and mental retarda-
tion.5 7
149. Some jurisdictions have already begun to define mental ailments in this
expansive manner. For example, Indiana defines mental illness as that behavior
which:
A) substantially disturbs an individual's thinking, feeling, or behavior, and
B) impairs an individual's ability to function.
The term mental illness also encompasses "mental retardation, alcoholism, and ad-
diction to narcotics." IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-4-3 (West 1994).
150. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Mossman, supra note 42,
at 5-6 n.17.
151. Collins, supra note 25, at 1231 n.19.
152. See, e.g., Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991).
153. Some jurisdictions have already started move in this direction. For ex-
ample, Indiana defines "incompetency" as "mental illness." Indiana's definition of
mental illness, encompasses psychiatric and "mental retardation, alcoholism, and
addiction to narcotics or dangerous drugs." IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-4-3 (West
1994). This is a substantially broad definition of what constitutes the type of
mental affliction that will exempt a condemned inmate from execution.
154. For an example of where this is more than likely what transpired see
the explanation of the Rector case supra pp. 126-29.
155. See Veltkamp, supra note 142, Lewis supra note 38, at 844.
156. Veltkamp, supra note 142.
157. Indiana is an example of one jurisdiction that has adopted a relatively
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C. Establishing A Uniform Standard for Determining When A
"Severe Mental Impairment" Activates the Protection Granted
By Ford
The penultimate step in the creation of an alternative competen-
cy-to-execute scheme requires deciding which standard, test, or mea-
sure of competency should be adopted in order to determine which
of the "severely mentally impaired" condemned inmates will ultimate-
ly benefit from the prohibition announced in Ford. To aid in decid-
ing which standard to select, it is useful to explore whether the Su-
preme Court has made any definitive pronouncements pertaining to
this topic. The opinion in Ford is the logical starting point. Unfortu-
nately, the majority in Ford did not address the issue as to which
measure of competency must be applied. In fact, Justice Powell, in
his concurring opinion in Ford, noted that one of the issues the
majority should have decided, but did not, was the appropriate stan-
dard for proving incompetency.'58 Furthermore, more recently, Jus-
tice Marshall, noted in his dissenting opinion, that the issue of the
requisite standard remained unresolved:
The lower courts clearly erred in viewing Ford as settling the issue
whether a prisoner can be deemed competent to be executed not-
withstanding his inability to recognize or communicate facts showing
his sentence to be unlawful or unjust ... [even] Justice Powell rec-
ognized that the full Court left the issue open' 9
Thus, presently, states are not required to incorporate a particular
measure of competency into their respective competency-to-execute
procedures.
Although the Supreme Court remains silent on the matter, two
standards-the single-prong"W and the double-prong-have been de-
expansive definition of the term used to identify the inmates who might be eligi-
ble to be shielded by Ford. Under Indiana law, incompetency is defined as
"mental illness." Indiana's definition of mental illness, encompasses psychiatric
and "mental retardation, alcoholism, and addiction to narcotics or dangerous
drugs." IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-4-3 (West 1994).
158. Ford, 477 U.S. at 418. Although the majority failed to address this is-
sue, Justice Powell went on to address it and advocated for the selection of the
single-prong cognitive test, see infra p. 134, as the constitutionally mandated
competency measure. However, since this measure was set forth in a concurring
opinion, the two-prong test does not reflect what is constitutionally required.
159. Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1241 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting
to denial of cert.).
160. This measure is also referred to as the "Powell standard," after the
standard advocated by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Ford. See
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422. It is also called the "cognitive measure." See Singleton v.
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veloped to assist in responding to this portion of the competency-to-
execute issue. Currently, more states integrate the narrow single-
prong test into their competency-to-execute schemes.' Justice
Powell describes the single-prong measure in the following manner:
the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are
to suffer it62
The condemned's cognitive ability is the critical feature under the
single-prong measure. Thus, if the condemned inmate is aware of the
punishment and knows why execution was selected as the appropriate
mode of punishment, then the condemned inmate is competent for
execution. Consequently, protection under Ford is unavailable. This
standard is narrow because it exclusively focuses on the inmate's
cognitive ability to comprehend what is about to occur and the rea-
son the act is going to occur. This rather limited approach hinders
the fact finder from examining other variables that undoubtedly could
present additional relevant factors that would provide a more accurate
and comprehensive picture of the inmate's mental status, which in
turn could negatively impact efforts made to ensure that Ford is not
violated.
The double-prong standard'63 is a second test used to measure
mental fitness for the purpose of determining the applicability of
Ford. This standard is typically described in the following manner:
a. Convicts who have been sentenced to death should not be exe-
cuted if they are currently mentally incompetent. If it is deter-
mined that the condemned convict is currently mentally incompe-
tent, execution should be stayed.
b. A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental
illness or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the
nature of the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for,
the reason for the punishment or the nature of the punishment. A
convict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental illness or
retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or
understand any fact which might exist which would make the
punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey
such information to counsel or the court. 64
State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 55 (S.C. 1993).
161. See Appendix 1 for a list of the jurisdictions that have adopted the
"single-prong test."
162. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
also Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Rector
v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239 (1991).
163. This measure is also referred to as the "cognitive plus ability-to-assist-
counsel test" and as the "ABA standard." The terms will be used inter-
changeably.
164. A.B.A. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-5.6 (1989); See also
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As the passage indicates, this standard is composed of two separate
and independent components. It is the inclusion of the second com-
ponent that makes this standard broader than the single-prong test.
The first component essentially adopts Justice Powell's cognitive
standard, also referred to as the single-prong measure. 6 However,
satisfying the second prong of this measure requires examining and
assessing the condemned inmate's functional capability.'66 Because
this portion exclusively focuses on the subject's functional ability to
assist counsel during the post-conviction proceedings it is frequently
referred to as the "ability-to-assist-counsel" prong. Determining
whether the requisite functional ability to assist counsel exists re-
quires assessing the condemned's ability to assist counsel in seeking
and revealing information that might be exculpatory or mitigat-
ing." It also requires examining the condemned's ability to effec-
tively communicate any exculpatory or mitigating information to
counsel. 6
The importance of the second prong of the above test, capacity
to assist counsel, is demonstrated by the findings of a study by Dor-
othy Lewis, M.D.'69  The study found that all the partici-
pants-condemned inmates-were suffering from some type of psy-
chiatric disorder which had not been revealed 70 prior to trial. Most
importantly, a significant number of the condemned inmates noted
that the reason the disorder had not been revealed was because he or
she did not think it was relevant so they did not inform trial counsel
of this information, or the condemned inmate was never asked the
appropriate questions that might have revealed the existence of the
Rector, 923 F.2d at 572-73; Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 55-60 (S.C.
1993).
165. See supra p. 134.
166. In competency to execute assessments, "[c]linicians should remember that
they [also] are evaluating the prisoner's functional capacity.") Small & Otto, su-
pra note 10, at 152 (emphasis added). The importance of possessing the capa-
bility to assist one's counsel should not be discounted. Concern for this ability
emerges from the time criminal proceedings are initiated. See generally A. LOUIS
MCGARRY, M.D. ET AL., COMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS
(Jason Aronson, Inc. 1974).
167. Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 55 (S.C. 1993).
168. This is set forth in the following manner:
if, as a result of mental illness or retardation, the convict lacks sufficient
capacity to recognize or understand any fact which might exist which
would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to
convey such information to counsel or the court.
A.B.A. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7.5-6(b) (1989) (emphasis added);
See also Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 55-58 (S.C. 1993).
169. See Lewis, supra note 38 (the study examined 15 death row inmates
with looming executions).
170. Id. at 844.
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mental disorder.' Thus, if the mental impairments had been known
prior to the post-conviction proceedings, the condemned inmate might
not have received a death sentence in the first instance. In addition,
this standard recognizes the fact that there are individuals, such as
mentally retarded people, who have the ability to understand what
something is and why it is occurring, but do not have the ability to
assist counsel, such as being able to communicate effectively with
counsel.'72
History provides reinforcement for incorporating the inmate's
functional capacity as a part of the Ford test. Apparently, this assis-
tance portion of the double-prong measure has been a component of
the competency-to-execute calculation for quite some time. Most
notably is one commentator's observation that Blackstone and Hale
concluded that one reason the rule prohibiting the execution of the
incompetent is necessary is because if the "prisoner [be] of sound
memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or
execution."'' This language suggests that these legal historians, in
recording the tradition of the exemption, realized that determining
whether the identified individual is indeed incompetent also includes
a determination as to whether the inmate will be able to assist his or
her counsel in pursuing post-conviction relief that might stay the
judgment of execution.'
In summary, given the historical basis and the fact that it is not
unusual for a pre-existing, but unknown, mental impairment to exist,
possessing the functional ability to assist counsel during post-convic-
tion proceedings supports the conclusion that the two-prong compe-
tency measure should be constitutionally required.
D. The Remedy: Commutation of the Death Sentence
The final component of the proposed competency-to-execute
scheme is typically excluded from the traditional competency-to-exe-
cute model. This is true despite the fact that it presents one of the
most difficult questions associated with this topic. The inherent dif-
ficulty connected to this last feature has been described in the fol-
lowing manner: "perhaps the most awkward procedural question...
171. Id.
172. See Ellis & Luckasson, .supra note 136.
173. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 24-25, 395-96 (emphasis added); Hazard
& Louisell, supra note 17, at 383.
174. See also George G. Grover, Comments: Criminal Law-Constitutional
Law-Execution of Insane Persons, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 246, 252 (1950); Ward,
supra note 39, at 60 (noting that two states specifically require the two-prong
test).
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is what to do if the defendant is found incompetent to be execut-
ed." 75 As previously noted, the typical response to this question
has been to stay the execution during the period of incompeten-
cy.'76 When the condemned inmate regains his or her competency,
the execution is no longer barred and can proceed as scheduled.7
Before a decision is made as to the appropriate resolution of this
issue, the restoration of competency issue must be readdressed.'78
For example, if the proper test is the conventional and outmoded
view that mental impairment can be restored because it is a tempo-
rary affliction is embraced, then the temporary stay of execution
resolution endorsed by Justice Powell in Ford might suffice.'
However, since the restoration of competency issue is not only a
complex issue, but also one in which the prevailing position appears
to be that mental impairment cannot be cured, 8 ' it is unlikely that
a condemned inmate can ever truly regain his or her mental facul-
ties.' 8 '
Consequently, if it is unlikely that a condemned inmate's mental
impairment will be cured, then even the strictest reading of Ford
precludes executing severely mentally impaired condemned in-
mates.' Thus, Ford would no longer simply function as a stay,
but would operate as a complete bar to the execution of any inmate
who satisfies the requirements of the proposed competency-to-execute
plan. The imposition of this absolute bar means that this proposal's
remedy requires that, upon the declaration and verification that a
condemned inmate is severely mentally impaired, the death sentence
is automatically commuted to a life sentence.
This solution to this component of the revised competency-to-
execute proposal already has its advocates. For example, if a con-
demned inmate in Maryland is deemed "incompetent", then the
inmate's death sentence is commuted to a life sentence without the
possibility of parole.' Furthermore, two other states-Nebraska'
and Kansas 85-- arguably have implicitly adopted commutation as
175. State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 73 (Wash. 1990).
176. See Appendix 1; see supra pp. 14-15.
177. See Appendix 1.
178. See supra pp. 119-25.
179. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
'ring).
180. See supra pp. 121-22.
181. Id.
182. The plain language of Ford specifically prohibits executing mentally
incompetent condemned inmates. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417.
183. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A (1991).
184. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29.2537 (West 1994).
185. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006 (1994). See also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
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the appropriate resolution to this issue as these states require the
death sentence to be permanently stayed if the condemned inmate is
"incurably" incompetent. Although, the remedy applied by Nebraska
and Kansas does not actually extinguish the sentence of death, it
functions in a manner that transforms the permanent stay into de
facto commutation of the death sentence to a life sentence without
the possibility of parole.
In conclusion, once a condemned inmate has satisfied all the
features of this new competency-to-execute proposal, then his or her
death sentence is automatically commuted to some variation of a life
sentence.'86 While, to some, this might appear to be a rather radical
approach to the situation,87 it does significantly reduce the likeli-
hood that inmates who in fact are mentally impaired will be executed
in violation of the substantive constitutional right guaranteed to them
by the Eighth Amendment."'8 Thus, the final component of the pro-
posal requires the commutation of all death sentences received by
those who are, or become, severely mentally impaired while on death
row.
III. Perceived Problems With The Proposed Competency-To-Execute
Plan
A. Introduction
Objections to this new competency-to-execute plan will undoubt-
edly be raised. The most significant objections will probably stem
from a general concern that condemned inmates will take advantage
of the alternative plan. This general concern is essentially that the
new scheme will result in an assault on the judicial system. This
perceived "assault" can be divided into three general categories: 1) a
ASSOCIATION, Death Row Inmates Shouldn't Be Made to Become Incompetent, 25
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Aug. 3, 1990, at 2. (An inmate should not be medicated for
execution but should instead have his sentence commuted to life).
186. Of course, the various jurisdictions would be free to select which varia-
tion of life to adopt: life without parole; life with parole; life, serve 25 years
before eligible for parole, etc.
187. However, this perceived "radicalness" can be significantly overstated. A
pragmatic consequence of implementing this alternative approach is reflected in
the reality that a significant number of condemned inmates do have and will
have mental impairments that prevent them from understanding what will happen
to them and why it will happen to them and thus, their death sentences may be
indefinitely stayed, which decreases the likelihood that they will ever be executed.
This is precisely what occurred in the Perry case. By invalidating the "medicate
to execute plan," Mr. Perry's death sentence is equivalent to a life sentence.
Dennis, THE ANGOLITE, supra note 44, at 46.
188. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986).
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW
concern that there will be an increase in the number of frivolous and
dilatory claims"8 9 that are filed; 2) delays in executions being car-
ried out"9 and; 3) an increase in the number of malingerers. Al-
though it is certainly possible that any of these fears could occur,
there are important reasons why these concerns, even if valid, should
not deter the institution of this plan.
B. An Increase in the Number of Frivolous and Dilatory Petitions
Filed
Certainly the possibility exists that this more expansive posture
of the competency-to-execute plan will encourage condemned inmates
to file meritless and/or dilatory. 9' As an initial response to this
charge, it should be noted that this criticism is typically over inflated
so as to detract from a plan's positive attributes." The proposal's
requirement that a "severe" impairment exist before an inmate can
proceed should screen out meritless and dilatory claims as con-
demned inmates suffering from minor psychological disorders will
automatically be excluded. Another critical consideration in the anal-
ysis of the effect the scheme might have on the filing of meritless
claims is that many condemned inmates have an aversion to being
labeled "severely mentally impaired."' 93 Under the social mores
operative on death row, many condemned inmates would rather be
labeled "bad" than "mad," even if it means forfeiting the right avail-
able under Ford. Thus, this pragmatic consideration should operate as
a deterrent to the filing of unwarranted claims for relief under Ford.
A more generalized rebuttal to the proponents of this concern is
that if the death sentence is carried out, its effect is irreversible.
Once a condemned inmate, mentally impaired or non-mentally im-
paired, is executed he or she can not be resurrected. The irre-
189. The submission of this proposal is not to suggest that the criminal
justice system should encourage or tolerate dilatory tactics, but simply that this is
a situation where in order for one group to be protected the system may have to
suffer being vulnerable to some abuse. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at 393;
see also Grover, supra note 174, at 247 (noting that petitions filed in one case
were "efforts to escape punishment on the insanity grounds").
190. A liberalized approach to the incompetent to be executed could lead to
indefinite delays. Grover, supra note 174, at 250. One commentator, in response
to this concern, has noted that "[t]he same delay would be occasioned by meri-
torious as well as frivolous claims of present incompetency." Larkin, supra note
16, at 789 n.104.
191. See generally Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at 393.
192. For example, one commentator has observed that "[t]he available his-
torical and empirical evidence, however, both undermines the forecast of a stam-
pede of unmeritorious claims." Larkin, supra note 16, at 790.
193. See Lewis, supra note 38, at 841.
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versibility of the sanction and Ford, which clearly and expressly
precludes executing the severely mentally impaired, act in tandem to
undermine objections to the proposed plan that are based on the
possibility of frivolous and dilatory filings occurring.
194
C. The Risk of Increased Delays In Carrying Out Executions
The adoption of the new proposal would expand the present
scope of protection offered by Ford. Such an expansion would in
all likelihood result in some increase in the number of petitions filed
seeking the relief available pursuant to the competency-to-execute
plan designed to achieve the goal stated in Ford. One possible con-
sequence of this increase could be delays in carrying out some of the
executions. However, delay is not a unique occurrence in our judicial
system; nor is it an unconstitutional one. Furthermore, "[t]he same
delay would be occasioned by meritorious as well as frivolous
claims."'9 6 Therefore, while delay is probably inevitable, it is of
such a quality that it must be tolerated in order to ensure the protec-
tion of a constitutional right guaranteed to condemned inmates. In
sum, the fact that "death truly is different from all other punishments
a society inflicts upon its citizens,"'97 mandates that any potential
delays must be abided.
Perhaps the best retort to potential detractors who want to rely
upon the perceived potential for delays in executions as an excuse
was expressed by Justice Frankfurter:
It is beside the point that the claim may turn out not to be meritori-
ous. It is beside the point that delay in the enforcement of the law
may entailed ... if life hangs in the balance, [it] is far greater in
importance to society, in light of the sad history of its denial, than
194. Of course, if the petition is filed in federal court and it proves to be
meritless and frivolously filed, the attorney and the client could be sanctioned
under Rule 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Hopefully, the possibility of the imposition
of sanctions on counsel will act to deter the practice of filing what are deemed
frivolous claims.
195. This is primarily due to the fact that the new terminology adopted and
the selection of the broader double-prong measure of existing severe mental im-
pairment enables that condemned inmate to seek harbor under Ford. See supra
pp. 133-37.
196. Rector, for example, could have filed under a more liberal standard and
been found incompetent. Thus, the petition would not be meritless or frivolous;
although, a delay in executing Mr. Rector would have occurred in order to deter-
mine the applicability of the Ford rule. See Grover, supra note 174, at 247; see
generally Hazard & Louisell, supra note 17, at 393, 399; Larkin, supra note 16,
at 789 n.104.
197. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
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inconvenience in the execution of the law ... how much more so
when the difference is between life and death' 98
D. The Possibility of Increased Instances in Malingering
There is always the concern that a plan, such as this one, will
provide condemned inmates with an incentive and opportunity to
malinger'99 or feign a mental disease. The central concern of this
objection is similar to that raised in connection with the objections
based on the belief that the imposition of the new scheme will trig-
ger a flood of meritless and frivolous motions in order to obtain
commutations of death sentences.' ° As with the concern about the
"flood of litigation," objections based upon malingering presents
another instance of efforts to inflate a perceived problem in order to
detract from the positive attributes of a necessary scheme.
Even if condemned inmates attempt to malinger for the purpose
of obtaining relief under Ford, the proposed competency-to-execute
plan contains safeguards devised to thwart these efforts. First, the
proposal requires that the condemned inmate suffer from a "severe
mental impairment." '' This requirement can only be satisfied if the
condemned inmate possesses certain designated characteristics, which
are verified by mental health officials. In addition, the plan does not
contemplate including those who suffer from mild mental disorders,
but rather from relatively severe disorders. This should function as an
initial filter for claims that are advanced by those feigning a mental
illness.
Another important consideration is that mental health officials
will be involved in the process of identifying the existence of the
severe mental impairment and in the treatment of the condition. Pre-
sumably, with their skill and training, a worker in the mental health
field should be able to detect an inmate feigning a mental impair-
ment."2 In fact, if a mental health worker suspects that a con-
demned inmate is feigning mental illness in order to obtain Ford's
benefit, there are several tests2 3 that can be used to assist in deter-
198. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
199. For a definition of malingering see Collins, supra note 25, at 1233
n.26.
200. See supra p. 140.
201. See supra p. 131.
202. See Collins, supra note 25, at 1233 n.27 ("[a] capable prison mental
health team of consulting psychiatrists should be available and trained to distin-
guish malingering from a true mental illness").
203. Lewis, supra note 38, at 842-43 (malingering can be confirmed with ob-
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mining the genuineness of the claimed mental impairment. Perhaps
most critical to allaying this fear is the finding that condemned in-
mates are unlikely to feign a mental impairment, even if it means
they could use it for dilatory purposes, such as postponing their
execution." Apparently, as previously noted,"5 a prison code of
ethics exists that deters inmates from feigning mental illness and en-
courages them to deny the existence of mental illness.' 6 Thus, the
existence of this social norm would operate to not only reduce in-
stances where mental impairment is feigned, but consequently would
act to reduce the potential for filing frivolous petitions and reduce
any delays that might be attached to the adoption of this plan.
PART IV
I. Conclusion
The competency-to-execute quandary is a complex and compli-
cated issue. The combined effect of the mandates from Ford,
Furman, and Woodson and the scientific progress made in the psy-
chiatric field require changes in the traditional approach to determin-
ing the competency-to-execute plan that is presently used by most
jurisdictions in the United States. The present lack of uniformity
creates a situation that is ripe for the exploitation of the Ford ad-
monishment. Thus, the adoption of a competency-to-execute plan that
includes a broader term, such as severe mental impairment, a defini-
tion of this term, in order to identify qualifying condemned inmates,
and the adoption of the broader two-prong standard, for measuring
whether a condemned inmate's mental acuity is at such a level that
he or she can be permanently exempted from the death sentence by
having their death sentence automatically commuted to some varia-
tion of a life sentence is warranted.
jective tests).
204. See Collins, supra note 25, at 1233 n.25; Lewis, supra note 38, at 841.
205. See supra p. 140.
206. Most condemned inmates will attempt to "minimize their psychiatric dis-
orders, preferring, it seem[s] to appear 'bad'; rather than 'crazy."' Lewis, supra
note 38, at 841.
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APPENDIX 2
PROPOSED COMPETENCY-TO-EXECUTE PLAN
SUFFERS FROM A "SEVERE MENTAL IMPAIRMENT'
+
FAILS TO SATISFY THE COGNITIVE PRONG
+
FAILS TO SATISFY THE ASSISTANCE PRONG
COMMUTATION OF DEATH SENTENCE
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